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Abstract 
African countries recorded impressive growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the global economic crisis 
of the 1980s dealt a severe anti-developmental blow on African countries. Eventually, African countries 
embarked on widespread liberalization of their economies following intense pressures from Bretton Wood 
institutions. This paper explores the notion that globalization have engendered the immiserization (a term used 
by Karl Marx to indicate increasing misery or depth of poverty) of African countries on the one hand and 
resulted in a sustained decline in the resources available for development interventions on the other hand. To get 
out from the underdevelopment quagmire, some specific directions were proffered for the development of 
African countries and these must of necessity include structural changes that encompass spiritual, economic, 
social, political, institutional, attitudinal, cultural and ideological transformations. 
Keywords: Africa, immiserization, development interventions, globalization 
  1. Introduction 
Knowing that poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere, the independent African States in the 1950s 
and 1960s placed emphasis on achieving a high rate of economic growth in other to alleviate poverty and 
improve the average living standard of their people. The growth strategy implicitly assumed that rising national 
income will ‘trickle’ down to the masses in the form of jobs and other economic opportunities or create the 
necessary conditions for the wider distribution of the economic and social gains of growth. However, the above 
approach failed to achieve its target and this led to the re-conceptualization of economic development in late 
1960s and 1970s as transcending mere increases in gross national product (GNP) to include changes in socio-
economic structures, reduction of unemployment, a more even distribution of income and the eradication of 
absolute and mass poverty  (Todaro, 1977). 
 However, just as the problem of severe poverty seems to be gradually abating in the ‘golden’ decade of 
development – 1970s, then came the early 1980s with global economic recession and the accompanying 
mounting debt problems of African countries. This situation provided the much needed opportunity for the 
Bretton Wood institutions, namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to use the 
instruments of loan disbursement and debt re-scheduling conditionality to ‘forcefully’ get African nations to 
embark on maximum liberalization of their fragile economies through the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes, and this in turn, greatly accelerated the pace of economic globalization (Khor 2000). Maximum 
liberalization of the economies of African countries implied a withdrawal of government or state from the 
economy and economic-policy making, which invariably led to drastic reduction in development interventions 
and the exacerbation of the poverty problem. 
Therefore, the basic objective of this paper is to explore the notion that accelerated economic globalization has 
resulted in the immiserization (increasing misery or poverty) of African countries on the one hand and declining 
financial resources for development interventions on the other hand. Thus, the above dual effects of globalization 
on African economies appear to be two irreconcilable divergent positions. Suffice to mention here that the 
concept of immiserization of the proletariat (see Hunt and Sherman, 1975) employed in this study is based on the 
work of Karl Marx who argued in his famous “doctrine of increasing misery” that the conditions of labour (in 
our sense, African countries) would worsen relative to the affluence of the capitalists (in our sense, the global 
capitalists powers located mainly in Western Europe and North America) as average income increases. 
The paper is organized into several parts as indicated below. Following the introduction, section two is centred 
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on the review of theoretical and conceptual issues while section three dwell on the immiserization of African 
countries in a globalizing world and section four focuses on the evidence of declining development interventions 
in a globalizing world. Section five attempts at providing some directions for Africa’s development and section 
six provides a summary and conclusion of the paper.  
2. Brief Review of Theoretical and Conceptual Literature 
To place subsequent discussions in a proper perspective, the concepts of poverty, development and globalization 
are briefly reviewed.   
2.1 Concept of Poverty  
 Ajakaiye and Adeyeye (2001) pointed out that a concise and universally accepted definition of poverty is elusive 
principally because it affects many aspects of the human conditions. However, Olaide and Essang (1975) averred 
that the income-based definition of poverty remains the best approach. Todaro (1977) posited that absolute 
poverty could be defined as the number of people living below a specified minimum level of subsistence income 
necessary to secure the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter – a kind of international poverty line.  
The World Bank (1983) towed a similar line but distinguished absolute poverty from relative poverty. In the 
main, the absolutely poor refer to people whose income is too low to afford an “ adequate” diet. The relatively 
poor are more simply defined as those with incomes below one third of the national average. Nwosu (2000) 
conceptualized severe poverty as a direct consequence of unmet basic human needs and basic human rights. He 
defined basic human needs as the mainly biophysical requirements for maintaining life, namely the amount of 
food, clean water, adequate shelter, access to health services, educational opportunity to which every person is 
entitled by virtue of being born.  
The World Bank (2002) indicates that poverty is a multi-faceted concept and the dimensions include:  
-    Lack of opportunity; this is related to low level and distribution of human capital as     
-    well as social and physical assets.  
-    Low capabilities; little or no improvements in health and education indicators among a particular  
           socio-economic group.  
-         Low level of security; exposure to risk and income shocks that may arise at the national, local,                                    
          household, or individual levels.    
-         Empowerment; the ability of the poor to participate in, negotiate with, change, and hold accountable  
           institutions that affect their well being. 
Sen (1981) presented the entitlement approach in analyzing and understanding the issues of starvation, famine 
and general poverty. Poverty is directly related to the ownership bundles possessed by individuals. A person’s 
ownership bundle consists of all assets owned including labour power, and this in turn determines his exchange 
entitlement, that is, the set of all the alternative bundles of commodities that he can acquire in exchange of what 
he owns. Thus, a person will be exposed to starvation if, for the ownership that he actually has, the exchange 
entitlement set does not contain any feasible bundle including enough food.  
2.2 Views on Development 
Todaro (1977), following the approach of Professor Seers in 1969, reformulated and broadened the questions 
about the meaning of development as follows: 
i. Have general levels of living expanded within a nation to the extent that absolute poverty (that is, 
deprivation from life-sustaining goods), the degree of inequality in income distribution, the level of employment 
and the nature and quality of education, health, and other social and cultural services have all improved?  
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ii.   Has economic progress enhanced individual and group esteem both internally vis- a vis one another? 
And externally vis- a vis other nations and regions?  
iii.  Finally, has economic progress expanded the range of human choice and freed people from external 
dependence and internal servitude to other men and institutions, or has it merely substituted one form of 
dependence (e.g. economic) for another (e.g. political or cultural) ?”  
If the answer to each of the above three questions is positive, then clearly these phenomena constitute real 
development.  
Sundrum (1983) viewed development as transcending a rise in income to include changes in the modes of 
economic behaviour of individuals in their production activities and economic relationship. Thus, if all 
government interventions are removed from all spheres of economic and social life, and the full enthronement of 
market forces is permitted, coupled with massive injection of capital/productive resources as neo-classical 
economists would prescribe, the less developed countries would still fail to developed and produce rapid 
increases in national income, primarily because they lack the requisite modernization ideals.  
Nwosu (2000) averred that human development is the process whereby economic and non-economic factors 
interact organically with one another to realize man’s creative potential and enhance his overall or integral 
personality, as well as that of his social, cultural, political and physical environment. Embedded in the non-
economic factors or intangible elements are structural changes that promote development. 
The South Commission (1990) summed up development as a process of self-reliant growth achieved through the 
participation of people acting in their own interest as they see them, and under their own control. Its first 
objective must be to end poverty, provide productive employment, and satisfy the basic needs of all the people, 
any surplus being fairly shared. This implies that basic goods and services such as food and shelter, basic 
education and health facilities, and clean water must be accessible to all. 
2.3 Globalization and African Countries 
Economic globalization refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world through the reduction 
of barriers to trade, migration, capital flows, technology transfer and direct investment (Uwatt 2004). 
Nwosu (2000), in a particularly incisive and pungent attack on the western globalization process observed that 
the most important causative factors propelling globalization is the bursting production capacity of the advanced 
capitalist economies attributable to their unjust control of world resources, inequitable modus operandi of 
international economic relations and the intense explosion in scientific technologic knowledge and skills in the 
West. With no other way out to release this immense production potential that is tied so much to their prosperity 
and power, decided to psycho-politically and socio-economically annex the whole world as market, and as a 
continuing source of resource inputs (raw materials) and, using their tremendous information technology and the 
democratization and free market appeal, to subdue the entire world under the hysterical drum-beat of a 
supposedly impending colossal economic well-being of all humanity, provided that everyone and every country 
provide them with thorough fare and the license  to do what they like with everyone and with every nation. 
Adei (2004) avers that globalization, whether seen in terms of internationalization, liberalization, 
universalization, westernization or deterritorization, is irreversible. It is a major reconfiguration of the social 
geography of the world, with implications for economic advancement or marginalization; global security and 
insecurity; justice and injustice, democracy or dominance.  
Kolodko (2004) added his voice to the variegated views on globalization. To him, globalization implies growing 
liberalization, which is followed by integration of the markets for capital, for goods, technology and labour. This 
would create new trends, risks, new opportunities, and possibilities, and as such there is the need for every 
nation’s leaders, intellectuals, businessmen to take advantage of the chances or to be exposed to the risks, noting 
that some countries are in a better position to reap from globalization because of the legacy from the past, 
because of the culture component and because of the geo-political position.  
The most important route by which globalization unleashes its deleterious and immiserizing impact on African 
countries is the globalization of national policies and policy-making mechanisms. National policies in economic, 
social, cultural and technological spheres that until recently were under the control of sovereign African nations 
have increasingly come under the influence of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
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World Trade Organization (WTO) and the transnational corporations as well as other big economic/financial 
players such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Paris Club of 
Creditors (see Koh, 2000). Indeed most developing countries have witnessed the erosion of their independent 
policy-making capacity and have been ‘forced’ to implement policies made by other entities, which may on the 
balance be detrimental to the countries concerned. 
As Koh (2000) pointed out, transnational and financial institutions control such huge resources, more than what 
most governments are able to marshal, that they are thus able to have great policy influence in many countries. In 
particular, the World Bank and IMF wield tremendous authority on African countries through loan and debt 
rescheduling conditionality which requires these nations to adopt structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
mainly drawn up by the Bretton Woods institutions. SAPs cover macroeconomic policies, social policies and 
structural issues which together ultimately constitutes the main driving force of African countries towards 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation and a withdrawal of national governments from socio-economic 
activities directed at poverty eradication.  Furthermore, the WTO greatly compounds the economic problems of 
developing countries by compelling them to implement unequal trade treaties that are weighted against their 
interest. Non-compliance with WTO agreements can result in trade sanctions being taken against a county’s 
export.    
3. The Immiserization of African Countries in a Globalizing World 
A global overview of the world economic performance indicates that most developing countries have been 
sidelined. For instance, in 1950, the average income of the 20% of people living in the richest countries was 30 
times higher than that of the 20% living in the poorest countries (mostly in Africa). By 1989, this ratio had 
doubled to 60 times.  
Additionally, Khor (2000) observes that the Human Development Report 1996, in reviewing the economic 
performance of developing countries, noted that only 15 countries have enjoyed high growth, while 89 countries 
were worse off economically than they were 10 or more years earlier. In 70 developing countries, the present 
levels were less than in the 1960s and 1970s. Since 1980, economic decline for most part of the developing 
world has lasted far longer and gone deeper than during the Great Depression of the 1930s. In some cases, 
people are poorer than 30 years ago, with little hope of rapid improvement.  
The World Bank (2005) observes that the population living on less than $1 a day in sub-Saharan Africa increased 
from 227 million in 1990 to 313 million in 2001 and is projected to rise to 340 million in 2015. In all other 
regions of the developing world, the population living below $1 per day is projected to fall. For instance, in East 
Asia and the Pacific, the population of the poor actually fell from 472 million in 1990 to 271 million in 2001 and 
is expected to fall to 19 million in 2015. South Asia achieved a real decline from 462 million to 431 million in 
2001 and the expected figure for 2015 is 216 million while China’s poor population declined significantly from 
375 million in  1990 to 212 million in 2001 and is projected to reached 16 million in 2015.  
The World Bank (2010) employed a different international poverty line to evaluate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It asserts that the number of poor people living on less than $1.25 (not $1) a day in sub-Saharan Africa actually 
rose from 296 million in 1990 to 388 million in 2005 but for almost all other regions, the trend has declined. 
Thus, regardless of the measuring yardstick employed, the story has remained pathetic and distressing for sub-
Saharan Africa.    
Some selected comparative socio-economic indicators for African countries and developed nations are hereby 
considered. 
3.1 GNP Per Capita 
 Table 1 at the end of this paper provides illustrative data showing the change in GNP per capita between 1990 
and 1999. The decade corresponds to the period of unprecedented liberalization and structural adjustment 
programmes in African countries.  
Among the African countries only Benin, Chad and Nigeria recorded marginal increases in income per capita, 
while the others suffered an outright decline or stagnation. Cameroon was worst hit with a colossal 40% decline 
in income per capita. On the contrary, all the advanced nations had a field day with income increases (as high as 
41% in the case of the United Kingdom). The gap between the world’s richest nation, Japan (in term of per 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.10, 2012 
 
 
19 
 
capita income in the above table) and the poorest African nation is obvious. In 1990, Japan had almost one 
hundred and thirty four (134) times the per capita income of Chad while in 1999, the gap further widened to one 
hundred and sixty one (161) times. 
3.2 GDP Per Capita, PPP (Constant 2007 International $) 
The poverty and backwardness of African countries is further illustrated when consideration is given to the trend 
of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for the differing purchasing power parity (PPP) of each 
country’s currency to reflect the cost of living. The data for some African countries and developed nations are 
shown in Table 2 for the period 1980 to 2007. In general, the GDP per capita of all the African countries declined 
between 1980 and 2007, except for Nigeria, Chad, Burkina Faso and Gambia. Only Burkina Faso maintained a 
sustained rise without suffering any dip in the years under consideration. 
Using the PPP equivalent, Japan’s per capita income was 24 times that of Chad in 1980 but only 23 times in 
2007 – a gap that is still considered too wide. 
3.3 Inequality 
Apart from per capita income disparities, globalization is also associated with regional and within country 
inequality. A key element of the current globalization agenda is the continued implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes and other related macroeconomic policies which ultimately enhance the income share of 
comprador groups/elites to the detriment of the poor masses in many African countries. Table 3 shows the pattern 
of income distribution among some African countries.  
The top quintile enjoys the highest income share, ranging from 41.7% in Ghana to as high as 55.70% in Nigeria. 
The lowest 40% of the population in both Nigeria and Niger became poorer, while the income share accruing to 
the top 20% increased in Nigeria, Niger, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire. It declined in both Ghana and Guinea. The 
case of Nigeria is particularly repulsive as the richest quintile enhanced their income shares at the expense of the 
remaining 80% of the population. Besides, according to O’Rourke in Uwatt (2004), the inequality gap – the ratio 
of the income earned by the income quintile to the income earned by the bottom quintile – increased for African 
countries from 9.6 in the 1980s to 12.9 in the 1990s. Additionally, the author’s calculation based on data from 
UNDP (2009a) shows that for the fifteen African countries in Table 4 (excluding Eritrea), the inequality gap rose 
to 13.1 in 2007 (when the richest 10% is compared to the poorest 10% of the population).  
3.4 Social Indicators (Health) 
The health variable is a key factor influencing the level of human capital. There are several indicators for 
measuring the health status of nations, and this in turn provides some insight as to whether a country is poor or 
not. The indicator employed in this paper is the life expectancy at birth, that is, longevity. Table 4 presents 
comparative data for a number of sub-Saharan African countries and industrially advanced nations. The life 
expectancy at birth declined absolutely for Zambia and Central African Republic between 1980 and 2010 while 
other African countries recorded marginal to modest increases.  
However, the African nation with the highest life expectancy of 55.663 years in 1980 (Cote d’Ivoire) is no match 
for the developed countries’ minimum of 73.382 years (United Kingdom). Similar reasoning applies to other 
time periods (see Table 4).  
Moreover, according to figures presented in the UNDP (2009a), the probability of not surviving up to 40 years is 
still very high for many African countries, especially for those below the Sahara. For instance, the following data 
shows the percentage of the population not likely to reach 40 years in some sub-Saharan African countries: 
Botswana (31.2%), Namibia (21.2%), Angola (38.5%), Cameroon (34.2%), Nigeria (37.4%), Zambia (42.9%), 
Benin (19.2%), Togo (18.6%) and Ghana (25.8%). To illustrate the development gap in respect to some other 
countries, some comparative statistics is given below: Singapore (1.6%), Israel (1.9%), and Poland (2.9%). The 
figures for the industrially advanced countries in Western Europe and North America are all below 1.6%. 
3.5 Social Indicators (Education) 
 Sound education, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, is another vital component required for human 
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capital development. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other regions of the world.  From Table 5, 
the adult population’s mean years of schooling is very low for African countries. The case of Burkina Faso, Chad 
and Niger is particularly worrisome as the average years of schooling are less than two. Compared to the United 
States, United Kingdom and Japan, the immiserization of African countries is obvious as the mean years of 
schooling in these countries range from 9.4 to 12.4 years. 
Furthermore, the bottom position of the human development index (HDI) seems permanently reserved for sub-
Saharan African countries which have consistently made up about 95% of nations with low human development 
index since the United Nations commenced the computation of HDI two decades ago. All these facts points to 
the increasing immiserization of African countries in a rapidly globalizing world of survival of the fittest. 
4. Evidence of Declining Development Interventions in Africa 
There has been a massive net outflow of resources from the South to the North by way of debt servicing with the 
resulting substantial decline in the volume of resources for development interventions in the areas such as 
improved health, education, food subsidy, infrastructure and other aspects of poverty reduction. Some countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, for many years, spent up to 25% or 30% of their annual budgets servicing debts, thereby 
leaving little or nothing to pursue growth and developmental aspirations.  
It has been pointed out by Ajayi in Uwatt (2004) that trade remains the main vehicle or means for Africa’s 
participation in, and full integration into the global economy. Unfortunately, the terms of trade of primary 
commodities (where African have comparative advantage) have been falling continually against manufactured 
goods, with many African countries suffering tremendous losses. This trend constrained foreign exchange 
earnings required to embark on development interventions geared towards reducing widespread poverty.  
According to the UN in Khor (2000), the term of trade of non-fuel commodities in comparison to manufactures 
fell from 147 in 1980 to 100 in 1985, to 80 in 1990 and 71 in 1992. This sharp 52% falls in the terms of trade 
between 1980 and 1992 had catastrophic effects. For Sub-Saharan Africa, a 28% fall in the term of trade between 
1980 and 1989 led to an income loss of $16 billion in 1989 alone. In the four years 1986-1989, Sub-Saharan 
Africa suffered a $56 billion income loss or 15 - 16% of GDP in 1987 - 1989. In the 1990s, the general level of 
commodity prices fell even more in relation to manufactures than in the 1980s. The income losses from falling 
terms of trade probably constitute the largest single mechanism by which real economic resources are transferred 
from Africa to the developed countries. These losses adversely affect the sustainable development prospects of 
Africa.  
The United Nation’s Trade and Development Report (2009) avers that since 2002 there has been a boom in the 
prices of primary commodities, including broad categories such as food and tropical beverages, vegetable 
oilseeds and oils, agricultural raw materials, minerals, ores and metals and crude petroleum . However, this 
salutary scenario for Africa and other developing countries came to an end in mid-2008 when it was truncated by 
the global economic crisis. Todaro and Smith (2009) observes that sub-Saharan African countries must still 
depend on non-mineral primary-product exports for a relatively large fraction of their foreign exchange earnings, 
which is a serious problem that carries with it a high degree of risk and uncertainty. Despite the positive annual 
percentage changes in primary-product export prices between 2002 and 2008, the long-term trend for prices of 
primary goods is downward and the current real price level is below what was obtained between 1960 and 1990. 
Due to the structural adjustment policies forced on African countries in 1980s and 1990s as conditionality for 
loan disbursement and debt rescheduling, the proportion of government expenditure devoted to health fell in 
most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1980s. According to UNICEF (in the South Commission, 1990), in the 
thirty-seven poorest nations of the world (mostly in Africa), spending per head on health care was cut by nearly 
50%, and on education by nearly 25% in that decade. At a time when the poor were suffering an already 
substantial drop in income, governments scrapped or sharply reduced, in the name of resource efficiency, food 
subsidies and other selective distributional measures. The implementation of adjustment policies accentuated the 
mal-distribution of income within developing countries. These inimical fiscal targets necessitated increase in 
medical charges, school fees, etc. in desperately poor countries, promoting school dropout, more deaths, and 
unskilled and consequently cheap labour. Furthermore, fiscal contraction was responsible for a waste of 
resources in the form of increased unemployment, and under-use of productive capacity. Thus, the massive lay-
off in economies where government is the dominant player promoted social unrest, and crime, both negating new 
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investment. 
As a result of pressures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, African countries 
embarked on maximum liberalization of import very quickly, leading to massive importation of consumer goods 
with high profit margins as opposed to producer goods essential for the smooth running of the economy. The 
usual action in this circumstance is to embark on a larger devaluation that would have been otherwise 
unnecessary. Outrageous exchange rates are detrimental to development. A country like Tanzania who dutifully 
implemented IMF’s SAP, has devalued its currency to the extent that by 1998, it is now 1500% less than it was 
in 1985.  The number of people now qualified as poor has risen to over 50% (Khor op cit). Additionally, the 
reduction/elimination of tariffs punished local producer, allowed for dumping of imports, thereby promoting 
massive layoffs (for instance, in the Nigerian textile industry) and social instability.  
The structural adjustment package fostered on African countries by multilateral finance institutions led to the 
privatization of ‘commanding heights’ in their economies (see Nwosu 2000). According to Aimiuwu (2004), 
equity liberalization or privatization of government assets is insensitive to the country’s stage of development, by 
promoting the off-loading of a nation’s assets, often to rogue officials, in a process of bandit capitalism. This has 
further reduced the economic opportunities available to the poor.  
5. Directions for African Development 
Based on the issues discussed in this paper, the way forward for Africa countries includes the following: 
• There is the need for African leaders and policy makers to imbibe or internalize the virtues associated 
with non-economic factors of development. The absence of these intangible elements has been a principal cause 
of backwardness in Africa. These non-economic factors include structural changes such as spiritual, social, 
political, educational, institutional, attitudinal, cultural and ideological transformations. The copious deficiency 
in this regard is the cause of widespread corruption and embezzlement of foreign loans, which in turn led to 
substantial liberalization of African economies. Various countries have achieved these transformations through 
different routes. Examples include the protestant ethics that helped in transforming Europe in the nineteenth 
century. Tough judicial approaches are in force in countries such as China, where corruption carries the death 
penalty with the law having no respect of persons. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings employed the violent approach to 
sanitize the Ghanaian society.    
• A broad – based industrialization that is export-oriented is a sine qua non for winning the globalization 
game. African countries must be able to progress along the industrial pathway by first of all, going through the 
first stage of import substitution industrialization whereby non-durable consumer goods are produce in sufficient 
quantity to meet the needs of the population and as such obviate the need for massive importation. Thereafter, 
we must proceed to the second stage of import substitution industrialization, during which we turn to the 
exportation of manufactured goods, and the domestic production of intermediate goods (that is, producer and 
consumer durables). These industries are capital intensive.  Next, we must advance further into medium and high 
technology industries, which constitute the main engine of growth. This is the kind of industrial strategy that can 
put unemployment perpetually on the run with increasing population. 
• The agricultural sector must be modernized in order to play its vital roles of not only providing food for 
people and raw materials for industries (reducing imports) but providing an important source of foreign 
exchange earnings through exports. 
• State interventions, planning and the market: African nations must decide what economic activities are 
best undertaken by the state and what are best left to the private sector. Western nations and international 
financial institutions should not be allowed to dictate domestic policies for African nations.  
• Regional Cooperation:  African countries should consolidate and further expand the existing levels of 
cooperation among them.  By joint endeavours to use to the maximum their different resources of expertise, 
capital, or markets, all would be able to address their separate and differing needs more effectively, thereby 
increasing the available options for development.  Regional cooperation would strengthen Africa’s bargaining 
position with the developed countries in a globalizing world; it will enhance autonomous development; will 
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create economies of scale for large number of industries; it will facilitate the provision of the critical minimum 
of resources necessary for research and development and for strengthening their scientific and technological 
capabilities. 
Some further tips for winning the globalization game are provided below: 
• Trade in primary commodities will continue to be important to African countries but both domestic and 
cross-country producers’ cooperation must be brought to bear to curtail the continued unfavorable prices and 
terms of trade. 
• African countries must strive and be allowed to embark on trade liberalization on their own terms. If 
conditions for success in globalization are not yet present in a country, then to proceed with liberalization and 
compliance with the ‘Washington consensus’ will produce negative results and persistent recession. 
• Developing countries must resolutely insist against all odds on retaining the ability, freedom and 
flexibility to make autonomous and strategic choices in finance, trade and investment policies. 
• Serious caution must be exercised when considering proposals for measures on further import 
liberalization at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The present imbalances and inequities in the world 
trading system should be addressed as a priority instead of any new proposal. The Agricultural Agreement that 
forbids developing countries from providing support and subsidies to their agricultural sectors, while allowing 
for massive food imports simultaneously should be reviewed immediately. It is on sound authority (World Bank, 
2000/2001) that developed countries spend an estimated sum of $63 billion annually to support and provide 
subsidies for their farmers. 
• African countries must not succumb to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
but rather should earnestly and urgently seek for a review. Such investment measures seek to prohibit local 
content requirement and foreign exchange balancing for foreign investors. If these were prohibited, the 
attainment of development goals would be difficult.  
• The collective loss of developing nations was most acutely felt in the Trade –Related Aspect of 
Intellectual Poverty Rights (TRIPS) after the Uruguay Round of 1994. This agreement will curb the adoption of 
modern technology by domestic firms in developing countries; it will lead to increasing Technical payments to 
transnational corporations; it will have a significant impact in product prices. Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement 
must be quickly amended. 
• There should be greater transparency and regulation of international financial market including proposal 
for a global tax on short-term financial flows, to penalize speculators.  
• African countries should use capital controls to protect themselves from international financial 
instability.  
• WTO meetings must be made transparent. 
• There is need to establish a more stable system of currency exchange rates. 
• It is imperative to put a stand still on new borrowings from international financial institutions for at 
least a few years. Excessive debts lead to heavy burden on national resources and provide the leeway for other 
nations and multilateral financial institutions to formulate domestic policies for us (these externally imposed 
policies include SAP, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, etc). 
• There is need to prudently manage foreign reserves by developing countries.  
• Africa countries must develop the individual capacities for international negotiations in WTO, etc. A lot 
of our predicament in the past is due to lack of knowledge and capacity of public officials attending these 
meetings, only to sign the final documents to the advantage of developed countries.  
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(For the above section, see: Khor 2000, Sundrum 1983, World Bank 2001, Todaro 1977, Nwosu 2000, Adei 
2004, Aimiuwu 2004, South Commission 1990 and Stiglitz 1996). 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The independent African States in the 1950s and 1960s placed emphasis on achieving a high rate of economic 
growth in order to improve the socio-economic conditions of their people. However, this strategy failed to arrest 
the problems of mass poverty, unemployment and inequality as the gains from growth failed to trickle-down. In 
the 1970s, a new development philosophy emerged, namely, growth-with-redistribution. The general standard of 
living improved for Africans during this ‘golden decade’. 
Unfortunately, the seeming prosperity of the 1970s was short-lived.  In recapitulation, the phenomenon of 
accelerated globalization especially with respect to African countries commenced in the 1980s following the 
global economic crisis during which these nations were forced to borrow from the IMF under tough 
conditionality involving the introduction of structural adjustment programmes ostensibly aimed at 
macroeconomic stabilization but with real intention of integrating Africa much more rapidly into the global 
economy. Thereafter, the era of increasing poverty or immiserization  began for African countries coupled with 
declining resources for development interventions, and thus, engendering severe cuts in social services such as 
education and health. Consequently, this paper examined the notion that globalization has led to the 
immiserization of African countries coupled with declining development interventions. 
It is evident from the analysis in this paper that the problem of poverty aggravated after the 1980s. The per capita 
income, the population below international poverty lines and income distribution statistics indicates a worsening 
situation of material deprivation. Furthermore, the health and educational indicators reveal that many countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa sank deeper into poverty. The above trend is a polar opposite to the increasing level of 
living standard in the industrially advanced countries as well as the newly industrializing countries. 
Since the globalization phenomenon is irreversible, there is the need for African countries to rise up to the 
challenge, and adopt strategies and policies that would result in winning the globalization game. A multiplicity of 
strategies has been enunciated in this paper and briefly put, the way forward implies that African countries must 
of necessity undergo some forms of spiritual, economic, social, political, institutional, attitudinal, cultural and 
ideological transformations. 
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Table 1. Per-Capita Income (U.S$) 
Countries 1990 1999 Percentage change 
(%) 
Benin 360 380 6.0 
Burkina Faso 330 240 -2.7 
Cameroon 960 580 -40.0 
Chad 190 200 5.0 
Ghana 390 390 0 
Kenya 370 360 -3.0% 
Nigeria 290 310 7.0 
France 19,490 23,480 20.0 
Italy 16,830 19,710 17.0 
Japan 25,430 32,230 27.0 
United kingdom 16,100 22,640 41.0 
U.S.A 21,790 30,600 40.0 
Sources: (i) World Bank, 2001 (ii) World Bank, 1992. 
 
Table 2. GDP Per Capita (PPP Equivalent) 
Countries                 1980      1990      2000      2007 Countries               1980      1990      2000      2007 
Togo                          1147       895        815         788 
Malawi                        800       654        746          761 
Cote d’Ivoire              2827     1982       1865        1690 
Zambia                       1615      1312      1090        1358 
Eritrea                         -             -            722           626  
Gambia                      1134       1128      1084       1225 
Liberia                       1910        520        469           362 
Burkina Faso              696        757         949         1124 
Nigeria                       1852        1550       1542      1969 
Guinea-Bissau        530         672        577           477 
Burundi                  456         512          358          341 
Chad                       819        1028        929         1477 
Congo (DR)            794         641         270          298 
Central Afr Rep.      988        847        777            713 
Sierra Leone            823         712        403           679 
Niger                       980         717        601            627 
Japan                      19,795     27,544   30,367   33632 
United Kingdom    19256      24,588    30,394  35130 
 
Source: UNDP (2009b) 
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Table 3. Inequality 
Countries Lowest 40% Middle 40% Top 20% 
Nigeria  (1996/97 
,,            (1992/94) 
12.6 
12.9 
31.8 
37.8 
55.7 
49.3 
Niger     (1995) 
,,       (1992) 
9.7 
19.3 
37.0 
36.6 
53.3 
44.1 
Zambia  (1996) 
,,           (1993) 
12.4 
11.9 
32.9 
37.6 
54.8 
50.4 
Ghana    (1997) 
,,            (1992) 
20.6 
19.9 
37.7 
37.9 
41.7 
42.2 
Guinea   (1994) 
,,          (1991) 
16.8 
11.3 
36.0 
38.5 
47.2 
50.2 
    Cote d ivoire (1995) 
,,             (1988) 
18.3 
18.0 
37.5 
38.0 
44.3 
44.1 
Compiled from:  World Bank (1996) and (2001) 
 
 
Table 4. Life Expectancy at Birth (Years) 
 Countries                 1980      1990      2000      2010           Countries            1980      1990      2000      2010 
     Togo                       54.823    57.718   59.757  63.272        
     Malawi                   44.812    49.278   50.991  54.611     
     Cote d’Ivoire          55.663    57.297   55.445   58.365      
     Zambia                   51.927    51.118   42.041   47.309  
    Eritrea                    44.049    48.093   55.942   60.429 
    Gambia                  46.499    51.205   53.928   56.586 
    Liberia                   47.585    48.504   54.442   59.112 
    Burkina Faso          44.946   47.420   50.373   53.701                   
    Nigeria                   44.755    44.551   45.896    48.420 
       Guinea-Bissau    40.171   43.812   45.836    48.580     
       Burundi              46.757    46.355   46.901   51.366                                   
       Chad                   48.262    51.212  49.299    49.216                      
      Congo (DR)         46.490    47.786  46.344    48.006 
      Central Afr Rep.  48.421    49.291  46.405    47.706 
      Sierra Leone         41.763   39.978  41.882    48.246 
      Niger                    39.415    41.622   46.413   52.485            
      Japan                    76.148    79.023   81.375   83.168      
      United Kingdom   73.382   75.726   77.834   79.344    
       USA                     73.916     75.223   78.006    79.584 
 
Source: UNDP (2010) 
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Table 5. Mean Years of Schooling (adults aged 25 years and above) 
Countries                 1980      1990      2000        2010 Countries               1980      1990      2000        2010 
Togo                         1.718      3.002    4.374      5.266 
Malawi                       1.754   2.507      3.034     4.261 
Cote d’Ivoire             1.312    2.091     2.744     3.307 
Zambia                      3.315    7.546     5.893     6.541 
Eritrea                         na            na          na           na  
Gambia                      0.655     1.237     2.009      2.831 
Liberia                       1.483     2.425     3.236      3.934 
Burkina Faso               na           na           na         1.251 
Nigeria                        na           na           na         4.960 
Guinea-Bissau       na             na           na        2.260 
Burundi                 1.081      1.715      1.822      2.690 
Chad                       na            na        1.509       1.509 
Congo (DR)          1.158       1.973    3.160      3.758 
Central Afr Rep.     1.011      2.042   2.828       3.534 
Sierra Leone           0.977       1.553   2.226      2.879 
Niger                      0.459        0.678   1.084     1.439     
Japan                      8.886       9.899    10.749   11.484     
United Kingdom     7.967      8.257     8.756     9.469     
United States          10.812    12.260   13.218  12.445 
Source: UNDP (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
